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GIFTS TO CHARITIES.
The popular notion of a charitable gift or enterprise includes
as an element a benevolent motive, while the legal view regards
rather the object sought to be accomplished than the motive
which induced it. But it is doubtful whether any accurate
discussion of what constitutes a legal charity is possible, if the
element of motive is entirely eliminated. Too great stress
was, perhaps, placed upon it in Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 35,
where the court adopted the definition by Mr. Binney that a
charity is "whatever is given for the love of God or for the
love of your neighbor in the catholic and universal sense-
given from these motives and to these ends-free from the
stain or taint of every consideration, that is personal, private
or selfish." This statement, if accepted as complete, vould
shut out whole classes of benefactions, which have been uni-
formly and justly regarded as charities. But it would be
unfair to the reputation of that great lawyer to assume that
he intended it to go without certain necessary limitations. No
human motive, however exalted, is absolutely free from the
taint of selfishness, for the simple reason that human nature is
unequal to the task of dissociating from its acts the ideas of
reward and of personal happiness, both of which are eminently
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selfish. What the author of the formula intended to say-
and left unsaid, probably, because it was clearly implied-was
that the dominant motive to a gift, which is to be held chari-
table, must be the public rather than a private good. The
motive may be a mixed one; it may be compounded in large
measure of egotism; but it must have in it some reference to
the welfare of the beneficiaries. As was said in Miller v. Porter,
53 Pa. 299, " if an act to be a charity must, indeed, be free
from any taint of selfishness, very much that passes under the
name is spurious, whilst the genuine article is so extraordinary
a virtue that we ought not to wonder that an inspired apostle
ranked it above the Christian graces of faith and hope."
Indeed, it is impossible to conceive of a gift whose purpose is
to relieve suffering or to elevate the public taste or to dispel
ignorance, which springs from an impulse wholly the reverse
of amiable or generous. On the other hand, it is repugnant
to the notion of a charity that the motive which prompts it is
a desire for pecuniary gain. The question of the motive of
the donor has been touched very lightly and very seldom in
the decisions by reason of the fact that it was so conspicuously
shown in the gifts under review, that it might well have been
taken for granted. The definitions which they give of a
charity, succinct like that of Lord Camden in Jones v. Will-
iams, Amb. 65 1," a gift to a general public use which extends
to the poor as well as to the rich," or comprehensive like that
given by Gray, J., in Jackson v. PhI1is, I4!Allen (Mass.), 556,
"a gift to be applied consistently with existing laws for the
benefit of an indefinite number of persons--either by bringing
their hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
relieving their bodies from disease, suffering or constraint,
by assisting to establish themselves for life, or erecting or
maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessen-
ing the burdens of government," presuppose a motive not
wholly compounded of self-interest. With the exception
which is to be noted, it is believed that no gift or scheme
has been adjudged charitable, where the motive of the -donor
or projector was the desire of pecuniary gain. He may
have been influenced in some degree by vanity, as in Miller v.
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Porter, supra, or by the hope of securing incidentally a per-
sonal convenience as in Martin v. McCord, 5 Watts, 493, but
his prevailing motive has always been the public good.
Two Pennsylvania cases may be selected as affording
material for the application and illustration of these principles.
They were utterly unlike in their circumstances and in the
points which they decided, but in both the question was
involved as to what constitutes a charity; and they are inter-
esting because one of them touches the belief and practice of a
large religious body, and the other distinctly repudiates the
motive of the donor as a factor in determining the character
of his gift.
In Rtymer's Appeal, 93 Pa. 142, a testator had bequeathed
a sum of money to be expended in securing Masses for the
repose of his soul. The gift was held to be obnoxious to the
Statute of 1855, which avoids legacies to charitable or relig-
ious uses, when made within a calendar month of the donor's
death. The argument of the court was that the saying of
Masses was a religious service and that a gift to secure that
service was of necessity a gift to a religious use. The act was
thus interpreted by the popular meaning of a religious use,
which may be roughly said to comprehend any service or act
of a religious as opposed to a secular character. As the case
was presented, the court was, perhaps, not called upon to dis-
cuss the legislative intent, and that question may be regarded
as open. The gifts which are avoided by the act are those
"for religious or charitable uses." When the legislature thus
joined in a common prohibition, two classes of charities, may
it not be inferred that it intended to place both on the same
technical plane and to subject both to the same technical rules
of construction? We have seen that a gift to a charitable use
must be for a general good, or "for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons." So a gift, properly speaking, to a relig-
ious use, must be equally general. In McLean v. Wade, 5
Wheat. 266, it was said that "a religious purpose is a chari-
table purpose," a proposition which is implied in the definition
just quoted that the gift must be intended to benefit its recipi-
ents by" bringing their minds under the influence of education
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or religion," &c. Mr. Dwarris lays it down as a rule in con-
struing a statute that "words of known legal import are to be
considered as having been used in their technical sense, or
according to their strict acceptation, unless there appear a
manifest intention of using them in their popular sense.'"
(Dwarris on Stat. 199.) It will hardly be argued that the
term "charitable uses" was employed by the legislature in its
popular signification, because that would have included a gift
for the relief of a single individual. Yet respecting a religious
use the court say "the service is just the same in kind whether
it be designed to promote the spiritual welfare of one or many."
This is exactly the popular notion, but it is not the legal. The
legal definition is founded upon the distinction between a gift
to one and a gift to many. For example, the service is the
same in kind where a testator bequeaths a sum of money for
the education of a poor neighbor, and where he gives another
sum for the schooling of a multitude; but in the one case his
gift is technically charitable and in the other it is not. So if
the testator in Rhymer's Appeal had donated a fund to provide
for religious services at the funerals of the poor of his commu-
nity, the gift would have been, in legal contemplation, a gift
to religious uses, and void under the statute. Yet his bequest
to pay for the ministrations of a clergyman or the services of a
choir at his own funeral, would have been good. In both
cases the service would be just the same in kind, because it
would be religious; but in the eye of the law, it would be
religious only where it was meant to be promiscuous. If
again he had directed payment for a single Mass to be said at
his obsequies, it could not well have been objected to, because
every man has a right to be buried in accordance with the
ceremonials of the church of his own faith, so long as they
violate no canon of public policy. The point which we would
make, is thus put by Woodward, C. J., in Miller v. Porter, 53
Pa., 300: "When in law we speak of religious and chari-
table uses, we mean something more specific and technical
than the pervading spirit of Christianity. We mean legal acts
done for the promotion of piety among men or for the purpose
of relieving their sufferings, enlightening their ignorance and
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bettering their condition." And he says, on page 298,
"Where the conveyance is to no ecclesiastic or church, or
church school or hospital, or for the promotion of religion in
any of its forms, or by means of any of its appliances, it cannot
be considered a religious use." The inhibition of superstitious
uses would not apply, inasmuch as the doctrine of such uses
cannot obtain in a country where there is no standard of ortho-
doxy. But if he could provide for the offering of one Mass,
why might h6 not for the payment of a hundred Masses,
limited as they would be to his individual needs? It will be
observed that his bequest was not by way of a trust, which if
-not charitable, would have been void as tending to a per-
petuity, but it was, of a principal sum, to be expended for
Masses. If the motive, or the purpose which includes the
motive of the testator, could have been allowed to operate in
this decision, it is hard to see how the gift could be held to be
other than non-religious. The thought in his mind was not
the advantage of the church, nor the salvation of souls; he
provided for his individual benefit and for the safety of his
'individual soul. Whether moneys received for Masses are
-a source of revenue to the church did not appear, and the
writer does not know; but if they are, they were in this
.-case a mere incident to the gift which could not determine
its original complexion. The testator was not influenced
by so remote a consideration any more than he would have
been in the ultimate benefit to a hospital, if he had directed,
among his other debts, that his board and nursing at such
an institution should be paid for by his executor. The
case may be rested on the ground, which, however, was not
taken in the opinion, that the gift was in express terms, to a
church, which in itself is a charity, and which in turn
impressed its character upon the gift.
McMzllen's Appeal, I I W. N. C. 44o, was a severe strain
upon the reasoning of the appellate court in Rltymes Appeal.
It was the case of a gift by a testatrix, of the residue of her
-estate, in trust to educate her nephew for the Presbyterian
ministry, and then to secure his ordination as a minister, with
-€he proviso that if lie should refuse or neglect to qualify him-
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self for that vocation, the estate should go to Princeton
College to be appropriated to the education of Presbyterian
ministers. In the opinion of the court the predominant
intent of the donor was to promote the prospects of her
nephew by giving him a respectable calling in life; in view of
which, any advantage which might accrue to the church,
was to her mind a secondary consideration. Probably the
person who would have been most startled by this designa-
tion of the purpose of the gift would have been the donor
herself. She could have said, and apparently with some show
of reason, that both technically and vulgarly her gift was
religious in character; that it was meant to strengthen the
church by providing it with a fully-equipped minister; and
that no matter what might be his opportunities in other
fields, nor what might be his unfitness for the duties of the
sacred office, if the legatee refused to act as her agent in this
mission, the gift to him would be forfeited in favor of an insti-
tution which would furnish a minister in his stead. The
exact distinction between this and the former case was that in
this the gift was to an individual for the benefit of the church,
and in Rkzy!mer's Appeal to the church for the benefit of an
individual; and the decision was that the gift in aid of the
church was secular and the gift in aid of the individual,
religious.
Boyd v. The Insurance Patrol, I 13 Pa. 269, and 12o Pa. 624,
was the case of a corporation whose chartered purpose was
"to protect and save life and property in or contiguous to,
burning buildings, and to remove and take charge of such
property or any part thereof when necessary." An injury
resulting in death having been inflicted by the careless act of
one of its employees in the course of his employment and an
action for damages having been instituted, it was decided that
the corporation was a charity and therefore exempt from the
rule of respondeat superior. The Fire Patrol was the crea-
tion of the Fire Insurance Companies of Philadelphia, and the
project originated in their desire to lessen their risks by mini-
mizing the destruction of property by fire. The saving of
life was rather an incident of its work than a formal purpose,
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the charter giving to the superintendent and patrol power "to
enter any building on fire or which may be exposed to or in
danger of damage from fire or water, and at once proceed t6
protect and endeavor to save the property therein and to
remove such property or any part thereof." The institution
was maintained by the contributions of the Insurance Com-
panies and brokers. The case is important, because it is the
first in Pennsylvania in which the motive to a gift was held to
be utterly irrelevant in determining whether the gift is chari-
table or otherwise. The work wrought by the organization
was so eminently and impartially useful, that it would seem
ungracious to challenge the motives of its projectors. Yet, if
we understand the definition given by the court, while it
expressly excludes the motive of the donor, it nevertheless
admits the necessity of resorting to his motive, in testing the
character of his gift. The court say : "The true test of a
legal public charity is the object sought to be attained; the
purpose to which the money is to be applied, not the motive
of the donor." What is the meaning of "purpose?" Wor-
cester defines it to be "that which one sets before himself to
be reached or accomplished, the final cause," and he defines
motive as " the cause, the reason, the principle." When we
speak of the purpose of an enterprise we do not mean its
professed purpose, nor what may be called its secondary pur-
pose; but we mean its ultimate and underlying purpose, and
in that resides its motive, or rather that is its motive. The
ultimate thing which was sought to be reached by the Insur-
ance Patrol was the saving of expense to its contributors; and
whether this thing be called its purpose or cause or reason, it
is in the last analysis.its motive. But if the purpose was one
of pecuniary gain, the enterprise, however beneficent, was not
a charity. This is precisely the position taken by the Supreme
Court when the case was first before it. "But that which is
the purpose of a public charity may be the distinctive purpose
of a trading corporation, out of which it is proposed to real-
ize profits; it is not the object alone of a corporation which
makes it charitable within the meaning of the law, it is the
mode in which that object is sought to be attained as. well as
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the purpose for which it is pursued. A private corporation
exercising a public function, or engaged in charitable work for
private gain, can certainly, in no sense, be characterized either
as a public agent or as a public charitable institution."
An illustration may be used to point this argument. Sev-
eral railroad companies may at vast expense, by their mutual
contributions to a common fund, open and maintain a park
for the entertainment of the public, the entrance to which and
the use of which shall be absolutely free to all. They may
advertise its purpose to be the welfare of the public, and the
enterprise may actually result in a positive gain to the health
and happiness of the community. The test laid down in Patrol
v. Boyd, would make this enterprise a public charity. The
object sought to be attained was the recreation of the public;
the purpose to which the money of the contributors was to be
applied, was the maintenance of the park; and the motive of
the donors was to go for nothing. Yet the final cause, the
impulse to which all other considerations bent, for the estab-
lishment of the fund, was to stimulate travel on the roads of
the contributors and to enhance their stock dividends. This
impulse, described as it may be by any term which human
ingenuity can invent, will after all other phraseology shall be
exhausted, remain the motive of the projectors. With this
motive in evidence it is clear that the avowed purpose of bene-
fitting the public, and even the beneficent results of the enter-
prise could not avail to relieve the fund from responsibility for
the negligent acts of those who superintended the park. The
parallel between the imaginary corporation and the Patrol
Company is a close one. In both the proclaimed purpose,
the public benefit, was the same; the contributions of money
in both were applied to that end; in both the results were
beneficial; and if the motive were discarded, the enterprise of
the railroad companies was as truly a charity as that of the
insurance agents. There is absolutely nothing by which to
distinguish between them. Superior merit cannot attach to
the Patrol because it was impartial in its work and sought to
save imperilled property whether it belonged to its own in-
surers or to strangers; the railroad companies were equally
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generous in opening their park to pedestrians as freely as to
the patrons of their cars. But in filling the resort with
visitors, the companies helped to fill their own conveyances
and to swell their profits; and in lowering the fire risk, the
insurance men lowered their expenses, and in that way
enlarged their dividends.
The volunteer association, in Humane Fire Company's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 389, was a charity. Why? Because its
object was to extinguish fires, and the purpose for which the
moneys donated to it was in furtherance of that object? No,
but because the motive of the donors was free from a merce-
nary taint. Instantly when a motive, purely of self-interest,
came into play, as it would if the association had sought only
to earn for its subscribers and members, a bounty offered by
the State or municipality, where a conflagration was stopped,
the undertaking would cease to be charitable, in legal estima-
tion. This was strongly put by Mitchell, J., whose opinion
was adopted in Donohugt's Appeal, 86 Pa. 312: "The
moment the word (charity) is used in connection with the
present subject-matter of charitable gifts or charitable institu-
tions, the popular as well as legal mind takes in at once its
wider scope of good will, benevolence, desire to add to the
happiness or improvement of our fellow-beings." And the
court proceeded to define as charities "private institutions
for purposes of purely public charity, not administered for
private gain."
A final consideration arises in connection with the cessation
-of the work of these organizations. It is at least doubtful,
whether, supposing the buildings and paraphernalia used were
.costly, the contributing companies ever contemplated the
relinquishing of their title to the property. If they did not,
their undertaking was not legally a charity. Certainly no
such intent could be ascribed to the originators of the sup-
posed Park. But if either that scheme or the Patrol is a
,charity, it will not be destroyed by reason of any failure in the
mode by which it was designed to be carried out; and under
the doctrine of cy pres, which, to this extent, at least, has been
-enforced in Pennsylvania, equity will substitute another mode
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which shall be consonant with the donors' intention: City v.-
Girard, 45 Pa. 27.
The constitution of the Patrol was unique in this, that the
organization in itself considered, and throwing out all reference
to the means and agencies by which its operations were pro-
pelled, embodied all the features of a charity. It issued no
stock and it earned no revenues, and its work resulted in the
saving of property and incidentally, perhaps, of life. It was
proper, therefore, that every technicality of the law should be
invoked to save it from the loss or embarrassment which
might follow if it were held to be other than a legal charity.
Given such a charter and such results, the legal presumption
would be that the motives which led to its establishment were
disinterested. But it is unsafe to say that, in a case where the
motives of the donor are divulged, they may be utterly dis-
regarded.
Under the guise of a separate and apparently independent.
organization, ostensibly entrusted with so much of their work
as enures to the benefit of the public, trading corporations
may escape with absolute impunity the liability which they
would otherwise incur through the negligence of their agents.
Take, for instance, again, the supposititious case of the Park.
It would be easy for the railway companies to place it under
the nominal control of a corporation which should have no
list of stockholders, and should declare no dividends, and
which should apparently cater solely to the public welfare..
Yet, if an accident caused by the criminal mismanagement of
the officials of the Park should result in the loss of many
lives, ought the responsibility in damages to be shifted from
those for whose pecuniary benefit the Park was really run,
upon the technical plea that the Park corporation itself
returned no dividends in cash, and was, therefore, a charity?-
In this connection, C/iapin v. Y. H. C. A., I65 Mass. 280,
may be profitably read. All that we have claimed as the gen-
uine mark of a charity is summed up in this extract from the
opinion in McDonald v. Mass. Hospital, 12o Mass. 435:
"The corporation has no capital stock, no provision for mak-
ing dividends or profits, and whatever it may receive from any-
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source it holds in trust to be devoted to the object of sustain-
ing the hospital and increasing its benefit to the public, by
extending or improving its accommodations and diminishing its
expenses. Its funds are derived mainly from public and private
charity; its affairs are conducted for a great public purpose,
that of administering to the comfort of the sick, witkout any
expectation on the part of those immediately interested in the
corporation, of receizng any compensation which will enure to
their own benefit, and without any right to receive such com-
pensation. This establishes its character as a public charity."
W, N. Ashman.
Philadelphia, October, 1896.
